Friday, December 2, 2011

Sabotage? Another Strange Incident at Brunswick Nuclear Plant in North Carolina!

The NRC reported an "CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONING AND CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEMS INOPERABLE" event today, during the startup of Unit 2 at Brunswick nuclear plant. The failure might have been planned as a force multiplier in what the POTRBLOG team suspects was a SABOTAGE attempt to recreate Fukushima at Brunswick during the previous Unit 2 startup attempt on 11/16/11.

Today's event was a "condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident". We question if today's incident had actually been designed to prevent/interfere with the emergency shutdown which occurred during the 11/16/11 startup failure of Unit 2.

Given the history of sabotage aimed at the nuclear core of the Brunswick Nuclear Plant, the POTRBLOG team once again calls for the FBI to lead a criminal investigation into the recent most unusual failures at Brunswick Nuclear.

The POTRBLOG team believes that the previous 11/16/11 Emergency at Progress Energy's Brunswick Nuclear Plant in North Carolina was an attempt to attack the United States by using a March 18th 2011 blue print described by David Lochbaum, the director of the Union of Concerned Scientists’ Nuclear Safety Project, on how the Brunswick North Carolina Nuclear power plant reactor containment seals could fail resulting in a Fukushima hydrogen explosion.

The above information combined with a history of sabotage at the Brunswick Unit 2 nuclear plant during maintenance and refueling outages leads the POTRBLOG team to believe that the improperly sealed Reactor Pressure Vessel was a man-made attempt to recreate a Fukushima style Nuclear Disaster in the United States.

Also see:
How Many Engineers Does It Take To Screw Down The Lid Of A Nuclear Core?



  1. Last night, 12/2, there was a very strange event at Fukushima.

    Some video has been captured here

    There appeared to be very large releases of steam or some similar substance colored red, pea-green, and bright blue.

    The cam line of sight was very distorted.

    This lasted for at least 2 hours.

    I am interested in your interpretations

  2. Majia's Blog, the blinking red light is on the crane, probably because they are flying Class 1 and Class 4 UAV's around the facility at night.

    The other pixel sized flashes could be an artifact of the speed doubling they appear to be using on the video; BUT if we were to make a SWAG, the brighter pixel flashes would be from Beta Radiation and the duller ones would be from Gamma Radiation. Neutron radiation would tend to leave black pixels on the camera.

    see this link for more info

    The steam does not look like fog rolling in, so it is most likely Radon Laden ground water steaming up from the underground corium. In the past, were we have data available, such steam events have correlated with Neptunium 239 detections.

  3. Thank you for your detailed feedback.

    There cannot be anyone left anywhere near that plant...

    I really need to know how much radiation we might expect.

    How can we possibly calculate in our area when the authorities are lying?

    I guess I'll have to buy a geiger and figure out fast how to use it...

    I see how much skill and knowledge are required to really analyze the data from your blog.

    The EPA just updated the latest peak for Phoenix where I live and it was 850 CPM beta.

    Although that number cannot be translated accurately to microsieverts without knowing the radionuclides that caused the spike, based on the EPA's own guidelines, I infer that it was at the very least 20 microsieverts an hour

    Have you any conceptualization of the real scale of what we are facing?

  4. Majia's Blog,
    There are two things one can do to get some idea of the risk.

    (1) Scour the fallout simulation maps and compare the fallout deposition rates of your locale with other locations to get some understanding of the proportional risk you face compared to other areas.

    (2) Measure the short half life fallout in your area, and work under the hypothesis that harder to detect long half life fallout is proportional to the short half life stuff.

    Those two strategies above should simplify the data analysis difficulties most people would face in determining their own relative levels of risk.

    The analyses you see us doing here on the blogsite are basically live Research and Development. The work has uncertainties and not all of the technology is fully ready to transition to the next TRL. In that regard, we certainly don't claim our analyses to be 100% correct, but we believe the risk mitigation we take based on those analyses to be prudent in the absence of better information.

    One of the primary reasons we share our work is to have others attack those uncertainties so that we may improve our own cost effective risk mitigation actions and transition those methodologies out of the R&D phase.